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Authenticity and Ethical Practice in IS: Technicism, Reflective Practice and
Answerability
Robert Stephens, University of the West of England, Robert.Stephens@uwe.ac.uk
Abstract
This paper examines the concept of authenticity in IS
ethics from a position informed from work in progress on
Bakhtin’s theory of dialogism. Three approaches to
ethical resolution are described: technicism and reflective
practice
 are found wanting with respect to authenticity,
while answerability generally conflicts with IS agendas.
Introduction
The ubiquity of ethical issues in computer use and
development is now recognized in the mainstream
literature (eg ACM, 1995). Professional consensus clearly
identifies some ethical problems; pornography,
intellectual property, surveillance, software piracy, model
and algorithm verity, and so on. Other areas are less
consensual; representation, power, responsibility, equity,
work discipline, for example, all have concealed ethical
challenges that are dilemmatic, and ultimately ideological.
The IS ethics literature tends to focus on explicating
ethical issues and problematizing or prescribing action,
but little attention is given to the identity of the virtuous
practitioner (Walsham, 1996). In his work on authenticity
Probert (1998) has questioned the adequacy of ethical
procedures in IS by suggesting that a slavish adherence to
an externally imposed code of values will compromise the
practitioners’ ethical stance. The virtuous practitioner has
responsibilities of interpretation and application, choices
that may not be very comfortable, but which may be
evaded by appealing to some external authority. Such
elision of authenticity may be countered with appeals for
reflective evaluation, but many accounts of the ‘reflective
practitioner’ remain highly instrumental in their prime
focus on mundane ‘knowing how’ or craft aspects of the
profession. ('Authenticity' here follows the usual
definition as that which is achieved when people take
hold of the direction of their own lives without the
direction being determined for them by external factors.)
In this paper authenticity and ethical practice are
explored from the perspectives of technicism, reflective
practice and answerability, a term derived from Bakhtin’s
(1981) philosophy of the act or deed. The paper is
developed from work in progress on dialogism in IS
(Stephens, 1997; 1999). Bakhtin argued that ethical
responsibility is constructed on an engaged participation
with others that cannot be displaced by theory, a clear
departure from the more familiar Kantian reflective
formulations of normative or consequentialist ethics, and
indeed, the reflective practitioner itself. Applied to IS,
Bakhtin’s concept suggests IS enquiry and practice is
internally legitimated and thereby unresolvable by a
universal ethics, but that authenticity is problematic
because of a normalizing agenda.
Technicism, reflective practice and
answerability
Conventional systems development methodologies do
not explicitly deal with ethical conflicts, but assume the
implicit acceptance of the single perspective embedded in
the methodology (Wood-Harper, et al, 1996). Most
methodologies only treat technical and rational issues, a
perspective that may be defined as ‘technicism’ (Halliday,
1998), or the presumption that good practice is equivalent
to efficient performance which achieves ends that are
theoretically prescribed for analysts. Technicism holds
that all practice is like production or service industry, that
quality may be guaranteed through standardization of the
development process, and that ultimately professional
practical judgments are suspect. This may delude
practitioners into thinking that they are less free to act
than they actually are, and ethical responsibility for an
action may be evaded by appeal to a theoretical
imperative (such as the laws of nature).
For technicists, general theories can be set out to guide
particular practices, but the narrower technical education
may be supplemented with sociology, psychology and
organizational studies to produce students better equipped
to face ethical and moral issues. The sort of criticisms
leveled at this academic model are that theoretical studies
are insufficient to guarantee effective IS professional
practice, or that their relevance to practice is not at all
clear, or indeed, that theory construction has become a
barrier to real world understanding (Barley, 1996).
Borrowing directly from an argument made by Carr
(1997) in teacher education, both theory-construction and
direct technical application of theories to practice can be
countered as follows:
1. The discovery of truths about the world or the
construction of theoretical explanations are not the
principal goals of IS enquiry, deliberation or endeavour.
In this sense, at least, IS theorizing does not
(paradoxically) appear to be primarily theoretical.
2. The precise relationship of such undeniably
theoretical forms of enquiry as psychology, sociology,
cybernetics and so on to the processes of practical
deliberation about organizations, the workplace and
people is inferentially complex, value-laden, contingent,
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and by no means straightforwardly construable in terms of
direct application.
3. Although IS discourse is primarily practical and
therefore concerned with the achievement of certain sorts
of goods, it differs from technical deliberation in not
being exclusively or even primarily concerned with
questions of efficiency and effectiveness in the course of
such pursuit. IS problems therefore cannot be solely
construed in technical terms.
4. Therefore IS discourse is evaluative or moral
rather than solely theoretical or technical. Evaluative
arguments, unlike theoretical arguments are defeasible,
and,  unlike technical inferences, means are invariably
related to ends internally or constitutively rather than
externally or causally (as theory demands).
A contrast to technicism appears in the idea of
reflective practice (Schon, 1987) where  ends and means
are continually reformulated by practitioners and
professionals’ own authentic insights are preseved.
Theory and practice are constantly reinterpreted within
particular contexts that can be described in both moral
and technical ways, and more elusive agendas such as
emancipation and democracy may be considered.
However, issues of authenticity that cannot be wholly
resolved by reflective practice are likely to occur in
situations where one is confronted with the ethical
question of “what should one do...?” (Probert, 1998),
because as Neitzsche acutely observed, life is lived
forwards, but understood backwards. In other words, the
person is participating in an event, and with others is the
architect of its meaning, before the ‘reflective practice’ of
contemplating the significance of that event.
This idea of the 'world-as-event' has been explored by
Bakhtin (1981) who maintains that there is a disjunction
or gap between immediate experience and symbolic
representations of this experience. Bakhtin attempts to
reconcile prosaic life (bound to our physical bodies) and
cognitive or theoretical thinking (free to move as it
pleases) in a concept of the answerable act, where ethical
responsibility arises out of the actualization of both the
repeated and the unique in specific social events. Bakhtin
finds both aesthetic and theoretical thinking problematic
precisely because they abstract what they imagine to be
‘important’ from actual events located within real time
and space, and gain life of their own within this abstract
realm of thinking. Retrospective mediation, such as
reflective practice, employing aesthetic intuition or
theoretical thinking divide the content of an act (its
product) from the act itself (or its actual historical
performance).
Bakhtin makes a special effort to reunite the aesthetic
(the shaping of meaning in action) and the ethical (a
cognitive element of the act itself) into one unified event,
and suspects Kantian transcendental a prioris cannot
address ethical problems and dilemmas as they emerge
within the everyday lifeworld:
 “‘Man-in-general’ does not exist; I exist and a
particular concrete other exists. If I remain in
communion with immediate experience and the
concrete other, then I can maintain a relation of
answerability
 to other selves and the world at
large, and can accept full responsibility for my
actions and words. Because my participation in the
world is unique and non-recurrent, shared by no
other person, no one else can accept responsibility
on my behalf. This explains Bakhtin’s striking
phrase: there is no ‘alibi’ in Being. In justifying
our deeds by recourse to an abstract ideology or a
sociopolitical imperative, we are provided with
just such an alibi for evading our responsibility, in
which case ‘what we have is not an answerable
deed but a technical or instrumental action’. If we
act purely out of obligation to such abstractions or
rationalized expediencies, then we ‘turn into
imposters or pretenders’, and abrogate the onus of
answerability” (Gardiner, 1996: 32).
Conclusion: Who Speaks?
Ironically, for technicism and reflective practice, as in
most analyses, no particular individual ever has to exist,
any abstract person will do. Yet the authenticity of the
‘moral agent’ has to be underwritten in the concrete
ethical act or the person need feel no responsibility for
their own lives or acts: privileging the abstract and
theoretical essentially leads away from responsibility and
ethical action, instead of towards it. Theoretical thinking
limits the degree to which individuals act responsibly
because it locates the most important aspects of an act
outside the responsible self participating in the event
itself. This may be a grave failing, for it allows
individuals to displace their unique responsibilities
through appealing to a categorical ‘good’ posited by
theoretical thinking.
The ethics of answerability is provocative for IS
because of an acquired mandate to contain the world
within immutable, unified systems of concepts and
categories: the normalizing of events, the displacement of
acts from actions, and the inevitable separation of the
prosaic and aesthetic involved in work textualization
(Zuboff, 1989), conspire against Bakhtin’s ethical,
authentic self maintaining a relation of answerability with
a non-abstract other.
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